Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2405.03893

Large Effects of Small Cues: Priming Selfish Economic Decisions

Abstract

Many experimental studies report that economics students tend to act more selfishly than students of other disciplines, a finding that received widespread public and professional attention. Two main explanations that the existing literature offers for the differences found in the behavior between economists and noneconomists are the selection effect, and the indoctrination effect. We offer an alternative, novel explanation. We argue that these differences can be explained by differences in the interpretation of the context. We test this hypothesis by conducting two social dilemma experiments in the US and Israel with participants from both economics and non-economics majors. In the experiments, participants face a tradeoff between profit maximization, that is the market norm and workers welfare, that is the social norm. We use priming to manipulate the cues that the participants receive before they make their decision. We find that when participants receive cues signaling that the decision has an economic context, both economics and non-economics students tend to maximize profits. When the participants receive cues emphasizing social norms, on the other hand, both economics and non-economics students are less likely to maximize profits. We conclude that some of the differences found between the decisions of economics and non-economics students can be explained by contextual cues.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Avichai Snir, Dudi Levy, Dian Wang, Haipeng Allan Chen, Daniel Levy. 2024-05-06. Large Effects of Small Cues: Priming Selfish Economic Decisions. https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.32166.74566

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Computing Endogenous Transformations in Processing Networks: A Dynamic Calibration Approach

Understanding how supply chains endogenously transform requires a parametric model of processing networks with non-neutral substitution elasticities. While the Cascaded CES production function provides a rigorous framework, dynamically calibrating its structural parameters from time-series data constitutes a highly non-convex inverse optimization problem. Since enforcing strict microeconomic concavity renders standard monolithic approaches computationally intractable, we propose a novel structure-exploiting algorithm to bypass this limitation. By leveraging the physical upstreamness topology of the network, our hybrid heuristic effectively breaks the curse of dimensionality inherent in economywide processing networks. Applying this framework to U.S. time-series data, we provide a scalable computational engine to fully endogenize complex supply-chain transformations, ultimately uncovering the elastic origins of asymmetric macroeconomic tail risks.

econ.GN

Access to Live AI Advice and Behavior Under Risk: An Incentivized Experiment

Generative AI has become an everyday advisor, and the systems people consult are live and interactive, not pre-scripted. We ask whether access to such a system changes behavior under risk. In an incentivized experiment (N = 158), participants made lottery choices with an optional decision aid presented as a conventional pre-written tool, a live one-shot AI, or a live interactive AI they could query, with information format held equivalent across conditions. Risk preferences are elicited via DOSE. We find no evidence that access to a live AI advisor changes risk aversion.

econ.GN

Screening Out the Needy: The Effects of SNAP Work Requirements

We examine the effectiveness of work requirements as a screening device in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Work requirements for "able-bodied adults without dependents" were suspended after the Great Recession and gradually reinstated across counties and states in the 2010s. Using linked administrative SNAP and employment data from five states and a triple-differences design, we find that work requirements reduce SNAP participation by seven percent without increasing labor supply and disproportionately screen out low-income individuals. We develop a welfare framework to interpret these results and find that the social costs of work requirements exceed budget savings.

econ.GN