Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2406.13969

Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models Robust to Nontransitive Preferences

Abstract

The Random Utility Model (RUM) is the gold standard in describing the behavior of a population of consumers. The RUM operates under the assumption of transitivity in consumers' preference relationships, but the empirical literature has regularly documented its violation. In this paper, I introduce the Random Preference Model (RPM), a novel framework for understanding the choice behavior in a population akin to RUMs, which preserves monotonicity and accommodates nontransitive behaviors. The primary objective is to test the null hypothesis that a population of rational consumers generates cross-sectional demand distributions without imposing constraints on the unobserved heterogeneity or the number of goods. I analyze data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey and find evidence that contradicts RUMs and supports RPMs. These findings underscore RPMs' flexibility and capacity to explain a wider spectrum of consumer behaviors compared to RUMs. This paper generalizes the stochastic revealed preference methodology of McFadden & Richter (1990) for finite choice sets to settings with nontransitive and possibly nonconvex preference relations.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Wilfried Youmbi. 2024-06-20. Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models Robust to Nontransitive Preferences. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13969

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Measurement of Trustworthiness of the Online Reviews

Online review platforms shape consumer decisions, yet reported ratings and comments may be unreliable when reviewers behave inconsistently. This paper models online reviews as a sequential choice problem and proposes a formal rationality pattern function that links a reviewer's current review to their revealed preference history. Building on a two-way consistency axiom for choices from nested sets, we derive an object-specific support trajectory and an associated degree measure in [0,1] (Average Propensity to Choose a Pattern, APCP) that quantifies review trustworthiness. The measure is designed to support information updating and reduce asymmetric information by discounting reviews that are inconsistent with past behavior. A worked example illustrates how the approach assigns trustworthiness grades to reviews for different objects and how these grades can complement aggregate rating statistics. Finally, a generalized theory has been established.

econ.TH

The Depth and Reach of Exploitation: Contracting with Endogenously Naive Consumers

Consumers can invest resources to understand and avoid their behavioral mistakes, and their incentives to do so depend on the market consequences of remaining naive. We incorporate this feedback between consumers' cognitive states and market outcomes into a general contracting model. Firms face a trade-off between the depth and reach of exploitation: deeper exploitation raises profit from a naive consumer but induces greater cognitive investment, promoting sophistication and shrinking the exploitable consumer base. This trade-off disciplines exploitation and can cause policies that benefit consumers when cognition is fixed to backfire when cognition is endogenous.

econ.TH

Contracting under Misspecification

This paper studies agency problems when both parties worry that the model linking action to output is misspecified. With observable actions, an optimal contract is linear in output, so performance pay arises solely to share misspecification exposure, the slope reflects the parties' relative robustness concerns, and its allocation is Pareto efficient. With hidden actions, this sharing rule survives and incentives add a nonlinear correction. Misspecification concerns can polarize effort by making intermediate actions impossible to implement. Moreover, ambiguity across competing models has asymmetric effects: uncertainty about desired actions raises the principal's payoff, whereas uncertainty about deviations can lower it.

econ.TH