Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2408.15158

Delay as Payoff in MAB

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a variant of the classical stochastic Multi-armed Bandit (MAB) problem, where the payoff received by an agent (either cost or reward) is both delayed, and directly corresponds to the magnitude of the delay. This setting models faithfully many real world scenarios such as the time it takes for a data packet to traverse a network given a choice of route (where delay serves as the agent's cost); or a user's time spent on a web page given a choice of content (where delay serves as the agent's reward). Our main contributions are tight upper and lower bounds for both the cost and reward settings. For the case that delays serve as costs, which we are the first to consider, we prove optimal regret that scales as $\sum_{i:Δ_i > 0}\frac{\log T}{Δ_i} + d^*$, where $T$ is the maximal number of steps, $Δ_i$ are the sub-optimality gaps and $d^*$ is the minimal expected delay amongst arms. For the case that delays serves as rewards, we show optimal regret of $\sum_{i:Δ_i > 0}\frac{\log T}{Δ_i} + \bar{d}$, where $\bar d$ is the second maximal expected delay. These improve over the regret in the general delay-dependent payoff setting, which scales as $\sum_{i:Δ_i > 0}\frac{\log T}{Δ_i} + D$, where $D$ is the maximum possible delay. Our regret bounds highlight the difference between the cost and reward scenarios, showing that the improvement in the cost scenario is more significant than for the reward. Finally, we accompany our theoretical results with an empirical evaluation.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Ofir Schlisselberg, Ido Cohen, Tal Lancewicki, Yishay Mansour. 2024-10-15. Delay as Payoff in MAB. https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.15158

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Incentivizing Honesty among Competitors in Collaborative Learning and Optimization

Collaborative learning techniques have the potential to enable training machine learning models that are superior to models trained on a single entity's data. However, in many cases, potential participants in such collaborative schemes are competitors on a downstream task, such as firms that each aim to attract customers by providing the best recommendations. This can incentivize dishonest updates that damage other participants' models, potentially undermining the benefits of collaboration. In this work, we formulate a game that models such interactions and study two learning tasks within this framework: single-round mean estimation and multi-round SGD on strongly-convex objectives. For a natural class of player actions, we show that rational clients are incentivized to strongly manipulate their updates, preventing learning. We then propose mechanisms that incentivize honest communication and ensure learning quality comparable to full cooperation. Lastly, we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our incentive scheme on a standard non-convex federated learning benchmark. Our work shows that explicitly modeling the incentives and actions of dishonest clients, rather than assuming them malicious, can enable strong robustness guarantees for collaborative learning.

cs.LG

Hierarchical Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

Imperfect Information Games (IIGs) are used to model games under uncertainty or lack complete information. Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is one of the most successful families of algorithms for IIGs. The integration of skill-based strategy learning with CFR could potentially mirror more human-like decision-making and improve learning on complex IIGs. It enables the learning of a hierarchical strategy, wherein low-level components represent skills for solving subgames and the high-level component manages the transition between skills. In this paper, we introduce the first hierarchical version of Deep CFR (HDCFR), an innovative method that boosts learning efficiency in tasks involving extensively large state spaces and deep game trees. Notably, HDCFR enables learning with predefined (human) expertise and extracting skills transferable to similar tasks. We first present the algorithm and establish its theory in a tabular setting, including hierarchical CFR update rules and a variance-reduced Monte Carlo sampling extension for the model-free setting, where backtracking is infeasible. We then extend HDCFR to large-scale tasks via deep learning objectives that match the tabular targets under exact function fitting. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/HDCFR_RUN-677B.

cs.LG

Achieving Linear Speedup with ProxSkip in Distributed Stochastic Optimization

The ProxSkip algorithm for distributed optimization is gaining increasing attention due to its effectiveness in reducing communication. However, existing analyses of ProxSkip are limited to the strongly convex setting and fail to achieve linear speedup with respect to the number of nodes. Key questions regarding its behavior in the non-convex setting and the achievability of linear speedup remain open. In this paper, we revisit decentralized ProxSkip and answer these questions affirmatively. We provide a unified convergence analysis for stochastic non-convex, convex, and strongly convex problems, revealing how gradient noise, local updates, network connectivity, and data heterogeneity jointly determine the convergence behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis showing that decentralized ProxSkip achieves linear speedup in the number of nodes under stochastic gradients. Moreover, our results demonstrate that local updates can effectively reduce communication frequency and improve communication efficiency.

cs.LG