Secure Wearable Apps for Remote Healthcare Through Modern Cryptography

Andric Li; Grace Luo; Christopher Tao; Diego Zuluaga

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arXiv · 2410.07629

Secure Wearable Apps for Remote Healthcare Through Modern Cryptography

Andric Li·Grace Luo·Christopher Tao·Diego Zuluaga

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Abstract

Wearable devices like smartwatches, wristbands, and fitness trackers are designed to be lightweight devices to be worn on the human body. With the increased connectivity of wearable devices, they will become integral to remote healthcare solutions. For example, a smartwatch can measure and upload a patient's vital signs to the cloud through a network which is monitored by software backed with Artificial Intelligence. When an anomaly of a patient is detected, it will be alerted to healthcare professionals for proper intervention. Remote healthcare offers substantial benefits for both patients and healthcare providers as patients may avoid expensive in-patient care by choosing the comfort of staying at home while being monitored after a surgery and healthcare providers can resolve challenges between limited resources and a growing population. While remote healthcare through wearable devices is ubiquitous and affordable, it raises concerns about patient privacy. Patients may wonder: Is my data stored in the cloud safe? Can anyone access and manipulate my data for blackmailing? Hence, securing patient private information end-to-end becomes crucial. This paper explores solutions for applying modern cryptography to secure wearable apps and ensure patient data is protected with confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity from wearable edge to cloud.

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BibTeX RIS

Andric Li, Grace Luo, Christopher Tao, Diego Zuluaga. 2024-10-10. Secure Wearable Apps for Remote Healthcare Through Modern Cryptography. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.07629

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