Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2410.11134

Functional Adaptor Signatures: Beyond All-or-Nothing Blockchain-based Payments

Abstract

In scenarios where a seller holds sensitive data $x$, like patient records, and a buyer seeks to obtain an evaluation of a function $f$ on $x$, solutions in trustless environments like blockchain fall into two categories: (1) Smart contract-powered solutions and (2) cryptographic solutions using tools such as adaptor signatures. The former offers atomic transactions where the buyer learns $f(x)$ upon payment. However, this approach is inefficient, costly, lacks privacy for the seller's data, and is incompatible with blockchains such as bitcoin. In contrast, the adaptor signature-based approach addresses all of the above issues but comes with an "all-or-nothing" guarantee, where the buyer fully extracts $x$ and does not support extracting $f(x)$. In this work, we bridge the gap between these approaches, developing a solution that enables fair functional sales while offering all the above properties like adaptor signatures. Towards this, we propose functional adaptor signatures (FAS), a novel cryptographic primitive and show how it can be used to enable functional sales. We formalize the security properties of FAS, among which is a new notion called witness privacy to capture seller's privacy, which ensures the buyer does not learn anything beyond $f(x)$. We present multiple variants of witness privacy, namely, witness hiding, witness indistinguishability, and zero-knowledge. We introduce two efficient constructions of FAS supporting linear functions based on groups of prime-order and lattices, that satisfy the strongest notion of witness privacy. A central conceptual contribution of our work lies in revealing a surprising connection between functional encryption and adaptor signatures. We implement our FAS construction for Schnorr signatures and show that for reasonably sized seller witnesses, all operations are quite efficient even for commodity hardware.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Nikhil Vanjani, Pratik Soni, Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan. 2024-10-14. Functional Adaptor Signatures: Beyond All-or-Nothing Blockchain-based Payments. https://doi.org/10.1145/3658644.3690240

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MIRANDA: short signatures from a leakage-free full-domain-hash scheme

We present $\mathsf{Miranda}$, the first family of full-domain-hash signatures based on matrix codes. This signature scheme fulfils the paradigm of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan ($\mathsf{GPV}$), which gives strong security guarantees. Our trapdoor is very simple and generic: if we propose it with matrix codes, it can actually be instantiated in many other ways since it only involves a subcode of a decodable code (or lattice) in a unique decoding regime of parameters. Though $\mathsf{Miranda}$ signing algorithm relies on a decoding task where there is exactly one solution, there are many possible signatures given a message to sign and we ensure that signatures are not leaking information on their underlying trapdoor by means of a very simple procedure involving the drawing of a small number of uniform bits. In particular $\mathsf{Miranda}$ does not use a rejection sampling procedure which makes its implementation a very simple task contrary to other $\mathsf{GPV}$-like signatures schemes such as $\mathsf{Falcon}$ or even $\mathsf{Wave}$. We instantiate $\mathsf{Miranda}$ with the famous family of Gabidulin codes represented as spaces of matrices and we study thoroughly its security (in the EUF-CMA security model). For~$128$ bits of classical security, the signature sizes are as low as~$90$ bytes and the public key sizes are in the order of~$2.6$ megabytes.

cs.CR

SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors

Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defenses, prior work has increasingly focused on stylized triggers, synthetic artifacts, and token-level perturbations designed to evade detection. However, this trend has shifted threat models away from naturally occurring semantic triggers and realistic low-budget poisoning settings. Addressing this gap, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, an optimization-based framework that transforms semantic-trigger seeds through autoregressive token replacement, sequentially minimizing embedding overlap with the inference-time trigger while preserving a strong per-sample training-time payload. The resulting SteganoPoisons maintain linguistic fluency and encode the payload across ordinary tokens, such that no individual token carries a concentrated signal and the full payload instead emerges from their exact combination and ordering. Across 18 encoder-based and decoder-only models spanning 120M to 14B parameters, SteganoBackdoor achieves high attack success under sub-percent poisoning budgets and exposes limitations in existing data-poisoning defenses.

cs.CR

Foundations and Design Principles of Lightweight Cryptography for IoT Systems

The successful deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications relies heavily on their robust security, and lightweight cryptography is considered an emerging solution in this context. While existing surveys have been examining lightweight cryptographic techniques from the perspective of hardware and software implementations or performance evaluation, there is a significant gap in addressing different security aspects, such as design principles, specific to the IoT environment. This study aims to bridge this gap. This research presents an examination with focusing on the security evaluation of symmetric lightweight ciphers commonly used in IoT systems. The objective of this study is to provide a concise overview of lightweight ciphers with emphasizing on their security challenges which is an essential consideration for real-time and resource-constrained applications.

cs.CR