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arXiv · 2501.18662

ReviewCoin: Paying for Real Work

Abstract

The peer-review process is broken and the problem is getting worse, especially in AI: large conferences like NeurIPS increasingly struggle to adequately review huge numbers of paper submissions. I propose a scalable solution that, foremost, recognizes reviewing as important, necessary, \emph{work} and rewards it with crypto-coins owned and managed by the conferences themselves. The idea is at its core quite simple: paper submissions require work (reviews, meta-reviews, etc.) to be done, and therefore the submitter must pay for that work. Each reviewer submits their review to be approved by some designated conference officer (e.g. PC chair, Area Chair, etc.), and upon approval is paid a single coin for a single review. If three reviews are required, the cost of submission should be three coins + a tax that covers payments to all the volunteers who organize the conference. After some one-time startup costs to fairly distribute coins, the process should be relatively stable with new coins minted only when a conference grows.

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Chris Welty. 2025-01-30. ReviewCoin: Paying for Real Work. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.18662

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