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arXiv · 2502.13543

Legal routes for accomplishing corporate environmental compliance against the "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality" goals

Abstract

Against the macro-background of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality" goals, eco-environment protection regulations are increasingly stricter. Facing high government regulatory risks and frequent environment lawsuits, corporate environmental compliance starts to play a vital role in healthy corporate operation. Law fulfillment routes constitute a critical part in corporate environmental compliance. Few academic scholars have conducted a profound analysis or discussion of legal accomplishment routes for corporate environmental compliances. As a matter of fact, legal routes for accomplishing corporate environmental compliance should be based proper theories concerning corporate environmental rights and obligations as well as dual layer nested governance structure (government environmental power and corporate environmental liabilities). Under the guidance of environmental jurisprudence, enterprises are responsible for setting up practical legal fulfillment routes for their environmental compliance-related rights and obligations. A diversified environmental governance layout composed of government regulation, enterprise self-discipline and social participation should be established. Within enterprises, effective legal routes should be developed for dealing with government regulatory risks and environment lawsuit risks at the same time.

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Yedong Zhang, Hua Han. 2025-02-19. Legal routes for accomplishing corporate environmental compliance against the "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality" goals. https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13543

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