The Vaccination Game on Networks

Abstract

Vaccinations are an important tool in the prevention of disease. Vaccinations are generally voluntary for each member of a population and vaccination decisions are influenced by individual risk perceptions and contact structures within populations. In this study, we model vaccination uptake as an evolutionary game where individuals weigh perceived morbidity risks from both vaccination and infection. We incorporate epidemiological dynamics using an SIR model structured on networks, allowing us to determine the evolutionarily stable vaccination level for any given network topology. Our analysis shows that vaccination coverage varies across networks depending on their structure and the relative cost of vaccination (the ratio of vaccine morbidity risk to infection morbidity risk). As this cost increases, vaccination uptake decreases universally, leading to a dominant non-vaccinator strategy when the cost is high. We find that networks with low to moderate degree variability have a relatively low evolutionarily stable vaccination level when this cost is low, as in such populations lower vaccination levels are necessary to achieve equivalent levels of disease prevalence to more heterogeneous networks with high degree variability, which thus show higher vaccination levels at lower relative costs. However, for heterogeneous networks, vaccination levels decline faster as costs rise, eventually falling below the level for the more homogeneous networks. Our findings align with previous studies on vaccination thresholds in structured populations and highlight how network heterogeneity influences vaccination dynamics.