Optimal Teaming for Coordination with Bounded Rationality via Convex Optimization

Abstract

Teaming is the process of establishing connections among agents within a system to enable collaboration toward achieving a collective goal. This paper examines teaming in the context of a network of agents learning to coordinate with bounded rationality. In our framework, the team structure is represented via a weighted graph, and the agents use log-linear learning. We formulate the design of the graph's weight matrix as a convex optimization problem whose objective is to maximize the probability of learning a Nash equilibrium while minimizing a connectivity cost. Despite its convexity, solving this optimization problem is computationally challenging, as the objective function involves the summation over the action profile space, which grows exponentially with the number of agents. Leveraging the underlying symmetry and convexity properties of the problem, when there are no sparsity constraints, we prove that there exists an optimal solution corresponding to a uniformly weighted graph, simplifying to a one-dimensional convex optimization problem. Additionally, we show that the optimal weight decreases monotonically with the agent's rationality, implying that when the agents become more rational the optimal team requires less connectivity.