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arXiv · 2504.06550

Blameocracy: Causal Rhetoric in Politics

Francesco Bilotta·Alberto Binetti·Giacomo Manferdini
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Abstract

This paper studies the supply and returns of causal rhetoric in politics: politicians' language linking political actions to outcomes through blame and credit. We fine-tune a language model to measure its use in 4.2 million congressional tweets spanning 2012--2023. Causal rhetoric is central to politicians' communication: it accounts for more than one third of tweets, is the language of political disagreement, and rises over time. The political returns of causal rhetoric are concentrated in blame. Combining campaign contributions with quasi-exogenous geographic variation in Twitter adoption, we find that exposure to blame has the largest effects on small donations. Using voting intentions from survey data and an event-study design around blame-only and credit-only days, we find that politicians' support rises in the week after blame-only days. Additional evidence suggests causal rhetoric, and especially blame, can turn complex economic mechanisms into underqualified yet plausible, politically convenient claims.

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Francesco Bilotta, Alberto Binetti, Giacomo Manferdini. 2026-09-01. Blameocracy: Causal Rhetoric in Politics. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.06550

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