Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2507.00415

Minimal Construction of Graphs with Maximum Robustness

Abstract

The notions of $r$-robustness and $(r,s)$-robustness of a network have been earlier introduced in the literature to achieve resilient consensus in the presence of misbehaving agents. However, while higher robustness levels enable networks to tolerate a higher number of misbehaving agents, they also require dense communication structures, which are not always desirable for systems with limited communication ranges, energy, and resources. Therefore, this paper studies the fundamental structures behind $r$-robustness and $(r,s)$- robustness properties in two ways. (a) We first establish tight necessary conditions on the number of edges that an undirected graph with an arbitrary number of nodes must have to achieve maximum $r$- and $(r,s)$-robustness. (b) We then use these conditions to construct two classes of undirected graphs, referred to as $γ$- and $(γ,γ)$-Minimal Edge Robust Graphs (MERGs), that provably achieve maximum robustness with minimal numbers of edges. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method via comparison against existing robust graph structures and a set of simulations.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Haejoon Lee, Dimitra Panagou. 2026-09-04. Minimal Construction of Graphs with Maximum Robustness. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.00415

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

Discover connections

Connections use source metadata and explicit phrase matches, not verified experimental comparisons.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

A Networked SIS Epidemic--Opinion Model with Higher-Order Interactions

This paper studies a susceptible--infected--susceptible (SIS) epidemic model coupled with opinion dynamics over a network of communities with higher-order interactions. Unlike standard networked SIS models, which account only for pairwise transmission, the proposed model incorporates group-level infection mechanisms and feedback between epidemic prevalence and community opinions. We establish local stability and instability conditions for a particular healthy equilibrium, derive a sufficient condition for global exponential eradication of the infection state, and identify conditions under which higher-order interactions induce bistability in the reduced dynamics on a positively invariant synchronous set. These results characterize how higher-order interactions alter the dynamics of opinion-dependent epidemic systems. Numerical simulations illustrate the predicted eradication, bistable, and endemic regimes.

eess.SY

Equilibria in Network Constrained Markets with System Operator

We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete à la Cournot, by choosing the quantities of good to supply to each market they have access to in order to maximize their profit. Every market is characterized by its inverse demand functions returning the unit price of the considered good as a function of the total available quantity. Markets are interconnected by a dispatch network through which quantities of the considered good can flow within finite capacity constraints and possibly satisfying additional linear physical constraints. Such flows are determined by the action of a system operator, who aims at maximizing a designated welfare function. We model such competition as a strategic game with $n+1$ players: the producers and the system operator. For this game, we first establish the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under standard concavity assumptions. We then identify sufficient conditions for the game to be exact potential with an essentially unique Nash equilibrium. Next, we present a general result that connects the optimal action of the system operator with the capacity constraints imposed on the network. For the commonly used Walrasian welfare, our finding proves a connection between capacity bottlenecks in the market network and the emergence of price differences between markets separated by saturated lines. This phenomenon is frequently observed in real-world scenarios, for instance in power networks. Finally, we validate the model with data from the Italian day-ahead electricity market.

cs.GT

Governing Well in the Algorithmic Age: The Foundations of Digital Statecraft

The digital substrate - data, algorithms, infrastructure, platforms, applications - is being governed without adequate conceptual foundations. The ability and legitimacy required to govern this substrate, and to govern with it, are simultaneously misaligned, contested, and structurally absent. We introduce digital statecraft as the organising concept for this emerging field, arguing that 'digital' reconstitutes the statecraft question rather than merely extending its domain. The concept operates on two dimensions - statecraft over digital systems, concerning the authority and capacity of the state in relation to the digital substrate itself, and statecraft with digital systems, concerning the deployment of algorithmic tools as instruments of governing authority. And it rests on two foundational requirements, technical coherence and legitimate authority, that are genuinely in tension. We derive ten principles of digital statecraft from these foundations, each naming a condition whose absence produces an identifiable and structural governance failure: public interest first, human-machine complementarity, governability by design, systemic coherence, hybrid institutions, adaptive governance, human centricity and civic agency, accountable and traceable authority, judgment across time, and the non-delegable core. This article takes the state as the starting point, the institutional form that developed historically in response to the problem of effective and legitimate public governance, and the only current candidate for which the full set of legitimacy conditions is institutionally available. But the digital statecraft programme holds open a deeper question than just whether states can reform themselves: governing well in the algorithmic age may require rethinking the boundaries, scale, and affiliative basis of statehood itself.

cs.CY