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arXiv · 2508.04003

The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction Re-Ordering

Bruce Mizrach·Nathaniel Yoshida
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Abstract

Two MEV builders now produce nearly 80\% of Ethereum blocks. Block builders have the ability to reorder transactions on the blockchain in a way that can be harmful to participants. We estimate participants would pay in the aggregate nearly \$7.2 million per month to guarantee that they remained in the first quartile of the block. Sandwich attacks, in which a transaction is front run, are frequent, averaging more than one every two blocks. Gas fees on these transactions pay for nearly 9.6\% of the MEV payments to the validator. Reforms such as gas fee priority or private transaction pools might be helpful.

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Bruce Mizrach, Nathaniel Yoshida. 2026-09-21. The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction Re-Ordering. https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04003

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