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arXiv · 2508.21105

Abstraction Principles and the Size of Reality

Bokai Yao
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Abstract

The Fregean ontology can be naturally interpreted within set theory with urelements, where objects correspond to sets and urelements, and concepts to classes. Consequently, Fregean abstraction principles can be formulated as set-theoretic principles. We investigate how the size of reality-i.e., the number of urelements-interacts with these principles. We show that Basic Law V implies that for some well-ordered cardinal $κ$, there is no set of urelements of size $κ$. Building on recent work by Hamkins \cite{hamkins2022fregean}, we show that, under certain additional axioms, Basic Law V holds if and only if the urelements form a set. We construct models of urelement set theory in which the Reflection Principle holds while Hume's Principle fails for sets. Additionally, assuming the consistency of an inaccessible cardinal, we produce a model of Kelley-Morse class theory with urelements that has a global well-ordering but lacks a definable map satisfying Hume's Principle for classes.

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Bokai Yao. 2025-08-28. Abstraction Principles and the Size of Reality. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020325100804

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