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arXiv · 2509.01434

LiFeChain: Lightweight Blockchain for Secure and Efficient Federated Lifelong Learning in IoT

Abstract

Internet of Things (IoT) devices constantly generate heterogeneous data streams, driving demand for continuous, decentralized intelligence. Federated Lifelong Learning (FLL) provides an ideal solution by incorporating federated learning and lifelong learning. However, the extended lifecycle of FLL in IoT systems increases their vulnerability to persistent attacks. This problem is exacerbated by the single point of failure. Furthermore, the single point of trust created by the central server hinders reliable auditing for long-term threats. Blockchain technology provides a tamper-proof foundation for trustworthy FLL. Nevertheless, directly applying blockchain to FLL significantly increases computational and retrieval costs with the expansion of the knowledge base, slowing down the training on resource-constrained IoT devices. To address these challenges, we propose LiFeChain, a lightweight blockchain for secure and efficient federated lifelong learning with minimal on-chain disclosure and bidirectional verification. LiFeChain is the first blockchain tailored for FLL. It incorporates two complementary mechanisms: the Proof-of-Model-Correlation (PoMC) consensus on the server, which couples learning and unlearning mechanisms to mitigate negative transfer; and Segmented Zero-knowledge Arbitration (Seg-ZA) at the client, which detects and arbitrates abnormal committee behavior without compromising privacy. LiFeChain is a plug-and-play component that can be seamlessly integrated into existing FLL algorithms for IoT applications. To demonstrate its practicality and performance, we implement LiFeChain in representative FLL algorithms with Hyperledger Fabric under 6 attacks. Theoretical analysis and extensive evaluations demonstrate that LiFeChain effectively mitigates long-term attacks, and significantly reduces latency and storage overhead compared to state-of-the-art blockchain solutions.

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Handi Chen, Jing Deng, Xiuzhe Wu, Zhihan Jiang, Xinchen Zhang, Xianhao Chen, Edith C. H. Ngai. 2026-03-30. LiFeChain: Lightweight Blockchain for Secure and Efficient Federated Lifelong Learning in IoT. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01434

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