Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2509.02879

Artificial or Human Intelligence?

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as large language models (LLMs) are already altering student learning. Unlike previous technologies, LLMs can independently solve problems regardless of student understanding, yet are not always accurate (due to hallucination) and face sharp performance cutoffs (due to emergence). Access to these tools significantly alters a student's incentives to learn, potentially decreasing the sum knowledge of humans and AI. Additionally, the marginal benefit of learning changes depending on which side of the AI frontier a human is on, creating a discontinuous gap between those that know more than or less than AI. This contrasts with downstream models of AI's impact on the labor force which assume continuous ability. Finally, increasing the portion of assignments where AI cannot be used can counteract student mis-specification about AI accuracy, preventing underinvestment. A better understanding of how AI impacts learning and student incentives is crucial for educators to adapt to this new technology.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Eric Gao. 2025-09-02. Artificial or Human Intelligence?. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.02879

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Measurement of Trustworthiness of the Online Reviews

Online review platforms shape consumer decisions, yet reported ratings and comments may be unreliable when reviewers behave inconsistently. This paper models online reviews as a sequential choice problem and proposes a formal rationality pattern function that links a reviewer's current review to their revealed preference history. Building on a two-way consistency axiom for choices from nested sets, we derive an object-specific support trajectory and an associated degree measure in [0,1] (Average Propensity to Choose a Pattern, APCP) that quantifies review trustworthiness. The measure is designed to support information updating and reduce asymmetric information by discounting reviews that are inconsistent with past behavior. A worked example illustrates how the approach assigns trustworthiness grades to reviews for different objects and how these grades can complement aggregate rating statistics. Finally, a generalized theory has been established.

econ.TH

The Depth and Reach of Exploitation: Contracting with Endogenously Naive Consumers

Consumers can invest resources to understand and avoid their behavioral mistakes, and their incentives to do so depend on the market consequences of remaining naive. We incorporate this feedback between consumers' cognitive states and market outcomes into a general contracting model. Firms face a trade-off between the depth and reach of exploitation: deeper exploitation raises profit from a naive consumer but induces greater cognitive investment, promoting sophistication and shrinking the exploitable consumer base. This trade-off disciplines exploitation and can cause policies that benefit consumers when cognition is fixed to backfire when cognition is endogenous.

econ.TH

Contracting under Misspecification

This paper studies agency problems when both parties worry that the model linking action to output is misspecified. With observable actions, an optimal contract is linear in output, so performance pay arises solely to share misspecification exposure, the slope reflects the parties' relative robustness concerns, and its allocation is Pareto efficient. With hidden actions, this sharing rule survives and incentives add a nonlinear correction. Misspecification concerns can polarize effort by making intermediate actions impossible to implement. Moreover, ambiguity across competing models has asymmetric effects: uncertainty about desired actions raises the principal's payoff, whereas uncertainty about deviations can lower it.

econ.TH