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arXiv · 2509.09185

Enhancing Cyber Threat Hunting -- A Visual Approach with the Forensic Visualization Toolkit

Jihane Najar·Marinos Tsantekidis·Aris Sotiropoulos·Vassilis Prevelakis
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Abstract

In today's dynamic cyber threat landscape, organizations must take proactive steps to bolster their cybersecurity defenses. Cyber threat hunting is a proactive and iterative process aimed at identifying and mitigating advanced threats that may go undetected by traditional security measures. Rather than waiting for automated security systems to flag potential threats, threat hunting involves actively searching for signs of malicious activity within an organization's network. In this paper, we present the Forensic Visualization Toolkit, a powerful tool designed for digital forensics investigations, analysis of digital evidence, and advanced visualizations to enhance cybersecurity situational awareness and risk management and empower security analysts with an intuitive and interactive tool. Through practical, real-world scenarios, we demonstrate how FVT significantly amplifies the capabilities of cybersecurity professionals, enabling them to effectively identify, analyze, and respond to threats. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that FVT has been integrated into, utilized, and continually enhanced within various EU-funded research projects over recent years.

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Jihane Najar, Marinos Tsantekidis, Aris Sotiropoulos, Vassilis Prevelakis. 2025-09-11. Enhancing Cyber Threat Hunting -- A Visual Approach with the Forensic Visualization Toolkit. https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdata59044.2023

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