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arXiv · 2509.10568

SG-ML: Smart Grid Cyber Range Modelling Language

Muhammad M. Roomi·Suhail S. M. Hussain·Daisuke Mashima
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Abstract

This work provides a detailed specification of the Smart Grid Modelling Language (SG-ML), which is designed for the automated generation of smart grid cyber ranges. SG-ML is defined as a set of XML schemas that describe a smart grid's configuration in both machine-readable and human-friendly ways, thereby bridging the gap between system modelling and automated deployment. Unlike prior ad-hoc approaches to cyber range design, SG-ML provides a unified methodology that integrates both power system and cyber network representations. The SG-ML model can be customized by users to meet specific requirements, such as emulating physical or cyber topologies and configuring network devices. An SG-ML Processor then parses this configured model to instantiate the cyber range environment. The modelling language leverages established standards like the IEC 61850 Substation Configuration Language (SCL) and IEC 61131 PLCopen XML to define power system topology, cyber network topology, and device configurations. This approach allows for the reuse of existing assets, reducing the effort needed to create the SG-ML model. To address gaps not covered by these standards such as attack injection parameters, scenario-specific metadata, and additional network constraints, SG-ML introduces proprietary schemas that complement standard models. Overall, SG-ML enables reproducible, scalable, and automated generation of realistic smart grid cyber ranges for research, training, and security assessment.

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Muhammad M. Roomi, Suhail S. M. Hussain, Daisuke Mashima. 2025-09-11. SG-ML: Smart Grid Cyber Range Modelling Language. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10568

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