Matching to two sides

Chao Huang

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arXiv · 2509.10942

Matching to two sides

Chao Huang

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Abstract

This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations exhibit same-side complementarity and cross-side substitutability. Our results apply to pick-side matching problems and membership competition in online duopoly markets.

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Chao Huang. 2025-09-13. Matching to two sides. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10942

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