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arXiv · 2512.13081

A General Theory of Piping Transportation: Unifying System Dynamics for Resilience and Sustainable Development

Abstract

The science of pipeline transport is currently governed by a collection of fragmented, discipline-specific theories that are inadequate for addressing the systemic challenges of 21st-century infrastructure. This paper introduces and formalizes a new, unified theory: the General Theory of Piping Transportation (GTPT), formulated by Darwisman. The GTPT posits that a pipeline system is a complex socio-technical entity whose state and long-term viability are determined by the fully coupled interaction of three interdependent domains: Physical Dynamics (Φ), Life-Cycle Dynamics (Λ), and Socio-Economic Dynamics (Σ). This paper presents the core postulates of the GTPT, which are derived from a systematic synthesis of the fragmented existing literature. The prescriptive power of the theory is illustrated by contrasting the strategic outcomes derived from the GTPT against those from classical theories. By defining resilience as the primary design objective and operationalizing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the GTPT provides a new theoretical foundation for the design, management, and governance of infrastructure across all critical sectors.

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BibTeXRIS

Samuel Darwisman. 2025-12-15. A General Theory of Piping Transportation: Unifying System Dynamics for Resilience and Sustainable Development. https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.13081

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