The Axiom of Consent: Authorization, Friction, and Multi-Agent Coordination

Abstract

Coordination research collapses four objects: operative control, authorization, a model-derived friction score, and observed outcomes. The Axiom of Consent is a stake-weighted unanimity principle; majority and supermajority thresholds are explicit relaxations, not versions of the axiom. Decision loci are structural facts, whereas authorization and legitimacy require normative and measurement premises. Alignment, calibrated stakes, and information deficit are candidate coordinates, and F = sigma(1 + epsilon)/(1 + alpha) is a phenomenological ansatz. The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism supplies a conditional persistence interface: irreducibility suffices for its finite, static, positive-fitness continuous-time Perron result; primitivity is required only for the corresponding discrete-time power convergence, and the componentwise ranking is narrower. Neither persistence result derives authorization. A resource-allocation instantiation specifies an identification contract but observes no authorization acts or effective voice. Its exploratory MARL companion uses target-vector correlation and observation noise as narrow proxy treatments, not measures of general alignment or information deficit. Under that proxy and reward-gap design, the composite loses to an independent-effects model and a feasible-centred frozen crossing yields the opposite interaction direction. Cooperative target correlation lowers the gap under shared-state contention; separable IQL is structurally invariant and separable VDN is a non-detection. Paired partial sharing modulates the gradient without establishing an exact dose law or endpoint equivalence. Target support changes opposition and residual-policy conclusions. The surviving contribution is an authorization architecture and measurement discipline, not a universal friction law.