Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2601.09573

On click-fraud under pro-rata revenue sharing rule

Abstract

Click-fraud is commonly seen as a key vulnerability of pro-rata revenue sharing rule on music streaming platforms, whereas user-centric is largely immune. This paper develops a tractable non-cooperative model in which artists can purchase fraud activity that generates undetectable fake streams up to a technological limit. We defend pro-rata by showing that it is fraud-robust: when fraud technology is weak, honesty is a strictly dominant strategy, and an efficient fraud-free equilibrium obtains; when fraud technology is strong, a unique fraud equilibrium arises, yet aggregate fake streams remain bounded. Although fraud is inefficient, the resulting redistribution may improve fairness in some cases. To mitigate fraud without abandoning pro-rata, we introduce a parametric weighted rule that interpolates between pro-rata and user-centric, and characterize parameter ranges that restore a fraud-free equilibrium under technology constraint. We also discuss implications of Spotify's modernized royalty system for fraud incentives.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Hao Yu. 2026-02-25. On click-fraud under pro-rata revenue sharing rule. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-026-00308-5

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Log-concave functions and transformations thereof

I summarize Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)'s review on log-concave functions, make several corrections, and augment the discussion with further results that can be useful in establishing monotone hazard rates. I also provide an application to monopoly pricing, where log-concavity of the demand curve implies strict concavity of the revenue function in quantity.

econ.TH

Audit the Auditors: Commitment versus Professional Judgment

This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the trade-off between the self-regulated peer review system and independent government inspection (PCAOB) in the auditing profession. We model the peer review system as a Judgment Regime, where a stakeholder utilizes professional expertise, captured as a private signal, to make ex-post decisions on verifying audit failures. In contrast, PCAOB inspection is modeled as a Commitment Regime, where the stakeholder lacks private information but can commit ex-ante to a predetermined level of verification. We find that the Judgment Regime benefits from a resource-allocation effect and a deterrence effect driven by informed verification, whereas the Commitment Regime deters audit failures through the first-mover advantage of ex-ante commitment. Our analysis demonstrates that the stakeholder prefers the peer review system if and only if the private signal is sufficiently informative. Furthermore, comparative statics reveal that higher verification costs or stronger audit incentives shift the stakeholder's preference toward PCAOB inspection.

econ.TH

Reputation, Disclosure, and the Scope of Entry

This paper studies how learning about an incumbent affects the scope of entry when competitive responses use resources shared across markets. An entrant chooses whether to launch in neither, one, or both of two markets. Entry into the second market reduces the incumbent's cost-reducing response in the first and can make one-market entry unattractive. The entrant learns about the incumbent's capability from a record of its response to an earlier rival. More frequent publication encourages a less capable incumbent to imitate a more capable one. An observed response then becomes less informative, and entry after that record expands. We compare publication of conduct with a public audit of capability. For an open set of parameters with uniform setup costs, full publication maximizes total surplus within the specified policy class when publication costs are low. Removing the interaction between response costs across markets reverses this choice, while preserving all early and singleton-market payoffs. A capability audit is dominated in both economies. Expected entry scope is constant across the considered policies within each technology, although productive investment and the allocation of entry change.

econ.TH