Search arXiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2603.03743

The Semantic Arrow of Time, Part II: The Semantics of Open Atomic Ethernet

Paul Borrill
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

This is the second of five papers comprising The Semantic Arrow of Time. Part I established that computing's arrow of time is semantic rather than thermodynamic, and that the Forward-In-Time-Only (FITO) assumption constitutes a category mistake. This paper develops the constructive alternative. We present the semantics of Open Atomic Ethernet (OAE) links as a concrete realization of a non-FITO protocol architecture. The key insight is that causal order is not assumed a priori but created through transaction structure: the link state machine progresses through TENTATIVE to REFLECTING to COMMITTED, with the option to abort at any point before commitment. Delivery does not imply commitment; commitment requires reflective acknowledgment -- proof that information has round-tripped and been semantically validated by both endpoints. We formalize this through three frameworks. First, the OAE link state machine, a six-state finite automaton whose normative invariants guarantee that semantic corruption cannot occur at the link level. Second, Indefinite Logical Timestamps (ILT), a four-valued causal structure that admits a genuinely indefinite relation between concurrent events, resolving only after symmetric link-level exchange. Third, the Slowdown Theorem applied to links, which establishes that round-trip measurement is the minimum interaction required to establish causal order. We show that ILT is strictly more expressive than Definite Causal Order systems for reversible link protocols. We connect these results to the Knowledge Balance Principle from quantum information theory. The paper concludes with a comparative analysis showing that OAE achieves infinite consensus number while RDMA, NVLink, and UALink remain limited to finite consensus numbers due to their FITO semantics.

Explore related subjects

cs.DC

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Paul Borrill. 2026-03-04. The Semantic Arrow of Time, Part II: The Semantics of Open Atomic Ethernet. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.03743

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

Reforge: Low-Latency Distributed GNN Serving with Selective Embedding Recomputation

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been widely adopted for their ability to compute expressive node representations in graph datasets. However, serving GNNs on large graphs is challenging due to the high communication, computation, and memory overheads of constructing and executing computation graphs, which represent information flow across large neighborhoods. Existing approximation techniques in training can mitigate the overheads but, in serving, still lead to high latency and/or accuracy loss. To this end, we propose Reforge, a system that enables low-latency GNN serving for large graphs with minimal accuracy loss through two key ideas. First, Reforge employs selective recomputation of precomputed embeddings, which allows for reusing precomputed computation subgraphs while selectively recomputing a small fraction to minimize accuracy loss. Second, we develop computation graph parallelism, which reduces communication overhead by parallelizing the creation and execution of computation graphs across machines. Our evaluation with large graph datasets and GNN models shows that Reforge significantly outperforms state-of-the-art techniques.

cs.DC↗
arXiv2026

Agentic AI Workload Characteristics

Agentic AI shifts LLM serving from isolated prompt-generation requests to stateful, multi-turn executions that repeatedly invoke the model, call tools, and grow context over time. This paper characterizes ReAct-style agents from both the LLM-serving and tool-execution perspectives using an end-to-end tracing infrastructure across reasoning and non-reasoning Gemma and Qwen configurations on five agentic benchmarks. Our study shows that agentic workloads are not simply long-prompt workloads: with effective context caching, most input tokens are reused across turns, making execution decode-dominated while increasing dependence on long-lived KV-cache state. We also find that tool use has a clear temporal structure, with agents shifting from read/explore behavior early in execution to execute/write behavior later. These results show that efficient agentic serving must jointly manage repeated model re-entry, persistent context state, and workload-dependent tool behavior.

cs.DC↗
arXiv2026

Byzantine Causal Reliable Broadcast (BCRB) with Constant-Size Message Metadata

Asynchronous Byzantine Reliable Broadcast (BRB) is a fundamental primitive that guarantees agreement and validity in distributed systems subject to Byzantine faults, but it lacks ordering guarantees. In this paper, we address Byzantine Causal Reliable Broadcast (BCRB), which builds on BRB to enforce causal message ordering. We present a novel BCRB protocol that decouples causal ordering from the BRB layer, achieving constant-size $\mathcal{O}(1)$ message metadata overhead and $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ communication word complexity as against $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$ communication word complexity of existing protocols; here $n$ is the number of processes. We present two variants of our protocol: a cryptographic version using a threshold encryption scheme and sequence gating, and its non-cryptographic version. In the cryptographic version, senders broadcast ciphertexts immediately, and decryption shares are piggybacked on out-of-band ACKs, preventing early decryption and front-running. In both versions, causal safety is achieved probabilistically. We evaluate the probability of causal safety violations using a random variable path analysis under independent exponential link delay distributions. We show that both variants satisfy liveness and the probability of weak safety violation is bounded by $\mathcal{O}(f^{-3}\cdot\ln^3 f)$, where $f$ is the upper bound on the number of Byzantine processes, and $f < n/3$ and $f=\mathcal{O}(n)$. Further, for the crypto version, we show that the probability of strong safety violation is bounded by $\mathcal{O}(f^{-1} \cdot \ln^2 f)$. We also show how to modify our two protocols to guarantee 100\% weak safety keeping $\mathcal{O}(1)$ message space overhead but with $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$ messages and $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$ communication word complexity.

cs.DC↗