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arXiv · 2603.29044

A user-driven pricing and scheduling framework for public electric vehicle charging

Fangting Zhou·Jiaming Wu·Balazs Kulcsar
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Abstract

Public electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure has expanded rapidly, yet utilization across charging stations remains uneven and often inefficient. Existing operator-determined pricing schemes offer limited flexibility to coordinate heterogeneous user demand within constrained capacity. This study proposes a user-driven pricing and scheduling framework for public EV charging. Users submit advance bids specifying acceptable time slots, bid prices, and quantity bounds. Based on these bids, the charging operator determines prices and charging slot assignments. After observing the outcomes, users decide whether to accept the resulting prices and allocations. The operator's decision problem incorporates profit objectives, user participation requirements, and capacity constraints across charging levels and time slots. The framework captures a three-stage interaction involving user bidding, operator decisions, and user acceptance. Numerical case studies reveal trade-offs among user acceptance, operator revenue, and charging capacity utilization under different charging levels. The findings provide practical guidance and insights into designing flexible pricing schemes that better accommodate heterogeneous user preferences while improving system efficiency.

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Fangting Zhou, Jiaming Wu, Balazs Kulcsar. 2026-03-30. A user-driven pricing and scheduling framework for public electric vehicle charging. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.29044

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