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arXiv · 2604.01127

Multi-Agent LLM Governance for Safe Two-Timescale Reinforcement Learning in SDN-IoT Defense

Abstract

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is increasingly adopted to secure Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks due to its centralized control and programmable forwarding. However, SDN-IoT defense is inherently a closed-loop control problem in which mitigation actions impact controller workload, queue dynamics, rule-installation delay, and future traffic observations. Aggressive mitigation may destabilize the control plane, degrade Quality of Service (QoS), and amplify systemic risk. Existing learning-based approaches prioritize detection accuracy while neglecting controller coupling and short-horizon Reinforcement Learning (RL) optimization without structured, auditable policy evolution. This paper introduces a self-reflective two-timescale SDN-IoT defense solution separating fast mitigation from slow policy governance. At the fast timescale, per-switch Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) agents perform controller-aware mitigation under safety constraints and action masking. At the slow timescale, a multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) governance engine generates machine-parsable updates to the global policy constitution Pi, which encodes admissible actions, safety thresholds, and reward priorities. Updates (Delta Pi) are validated through stress testing and deployed only with non-regression and safety guarantees, ensuring an auditable evolution without retraining RL agents. Evaluation under heterogeneous IoT traffic and adversarial stress shows improvements of 9.1% Macro-F1 over PPO and 15.4% over static baselines. Worst-case degradation drops by 36.8%, controller backlog peaks by 42.7%, and RTT p95 inflation remains below 5.8% under high-intensity attacks. Policy evolution converges within five cycles, reducing catastrophic overload from 11.6% to 2.3%.

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BibTeXRIS

Saeid Jamshidi, Negar Shahabi, Foutse Khomh, Carol Fung, Mohammad Hamdaqa. 2026-06-23. Multi-Agent LLM Governance for Safe Two-Timescale Reinforcement Learning in SDN-IoT Defense. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.01127

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