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arXiv · 2605.11619

PhishSigma++: Malicious Email Detection with Typed Entity Relations

Abstract

Here is a further shortened version (pure text, no extra formatting, academic style preserved, no content change): Abstract. With the rise of AI-generated content (AIGC), phishing actors now possess richer linguistic capabilities and evasion techniques. Most existing detectors over-rely on mutable textual features, achieving high accuracy on clean data but degrading severely under text-focused adversarial manipulation. This mirrors the lab-to-real performance gap. We investigate invariant signals in phishing emails: even when attackers modify surface text, functional intent constrains relations among typed entities. Threat-actor tradecraft is described via high-level TTPs, but rule-based systems like Sigma express invariants only through manually curated, field-specific patterns, limiting flexibility. We introduce PhishSigma++, an entity-relation-based malicious email detector for RFC822 messages that generalizes Sigma's design. It extracts 40 typed entity classes, computes 5 cross-type relations to build a typed email graph, and uses particle swarm optimization (PSO) to select a sparse discriminative mask, supporting classification and type-level evidence summary. On 29,142 messages, PhishSigma++ achieves 0.9675 F1 on clean data and outperforms text-centric baselines under non-adaptive Good Word padding at \r{ho}=0.8. It maintains 0.9579 F1, while a token-based Bayesian filter collapses to 0.0243 and a DistilBERT phishing checkpoint falls to 0.7284. Compared with traditional Sigma rules, PhishSigma++ offers higher detection, broader relational invariance coverage, and data-driven feature selection. We also show that thresholded typed relation scores encode a useful fragment of Sigma-style field conditions, unifying hand-crafted rule logic and learned relation masks in a single-email framework.

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Shang Shang, Ruiqi Wang, Ruijie Qi, Hao Li, Yingxiao Xiang, Yepeng Yao, Zhengwei Jiang. 2026-05-12. PhishSigma++: Malicious Email Detection with Typed Entity Relations. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11619

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