Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2605.28645

GraphSteal: Structural Knowledge Stealing from Graph RAG via Traversal Reconstruction

Abstract

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances LLMs by grounding generation in query-relevant external evidence. Beyond unstructured text corpora, Graph RAG integrates knowledge graphs into the retrieval pipeline, enabling LLMs to access entities, relations, and multi-hop dependencies encoded in structured knowledge. However, the same structured knowledge that empowers Graph RAG also creates a new privacy attack surface. We demonstrate that Graph RAG systems can be turned into structural oracles: through adaptive black-box interactions, an adversary can elicit sufficient relational evidence to reconstruct substantial portions of the hidden knowledge graph. We propose a structure-oriented reconstruction framework that recovers targeted graphs from both local and global perspectives. Specifically, Depth-Wise Heuristic Search extracts fine-grained node attributes by recursively expanding entity-centered evidence, while Breadth-Wise Diffusion Search infers graph topology by propagating across relation-induced neighborhoods. Experiments on generic and healthcare scenarios demonstrate that our method can recover over 90\% of the original knowledge graph from representative Graph RAG systems, revealing sensitive entities, relations, and structural dependencies with high fidelity. Existing guradrails provide limited defense against our attack, highlighting the inherent difficulty of safeguarding structural privacy in Graph RAG pipelines.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Jinze Gu, Qinghua Mao, Xi Lin, Jun Wu. 2026-05-27. GraphSteal: Structural Knowledge Stealing from Graph RAG via Traversal Reconstruction. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.28645

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MIRANDA: short signatures from a leakage-free full-domain-hash scheme

We present $\mathsf{Miranda}$, the first family of full-domain-hash signatures based on matrix codes. This signature scheme fulfils the paradigm of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan ($\mathsf{GPV}$), which gives strong security guarantees. Our trapdoor is very simple and generic: if we propose it with matrix codes, it can actually be instantiated in many other ways since it only involves a subcode of a decodable code (or lattice) in a unique decoding regime of parameters. Though $\mathsf{Miranda}$ signing algorithm relies on a decoding task where there is exactly one solution, there are many possible signatures given a message to sign and we ensure that signatures are not leaking information on their underlying trapdoor by means of a very simple procedure involving the drawing of a small number of uniform bits. In particular $\mathsf{Miranda}$ does not use a rejection sampling procedure which makes its implementation a very simple task contrary to other $\mathsf{GPV}$-like signatures schemes such as $\mathsf{Falcon}$ or even $\mathsf{Wave}$. We instantiate $\mathsf{Miranda}$ with the famous family of Gabidulin codes represented as spaces of matrices and we study thoroughly its security (in the EUF-CMA security model). For~$128$ bits of classical security, the signature sizes are as low as~$90$ bytes and the public key sizes are in the order of~$2.6$ megabytes.

cs.CR

SteganoBackdoor: Evading Data-Poisoning Defenses via Steganographic Backdoors

Transformer-based models are highly susceptible to backdoor attacks via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To red-team existing data-poisoning defenses, prior work has increasingly focused on stylized triggers, synthetic artifacts, and token-level perturbations designed to evade detection. However, this trend has shifted threat models away from naturally occurring semantic triggers and realistic low-budget poisoning settings. Addressing this gap, we introduce SteganoBackdoor, an optimization-based framework that transforms semantic-trigger seeds through autoregressive token replacement, sequentially minimizing embedding overlap with the inference-time trigger while preserving a strong per-sample training-time payload. The resulting SteganoPoisons maintain linguistic fluency and encode the payload across ordinary tokens, such that no individual token carries a concentrated signal and the full payload instead emerges from their exact combination and ordering. Across 18 encoder-based and decoder-only models spanning 120M to 14B parameters, SteganoBackdoor achieves high attack success under sub-percent poisoning budgets and exposes limitations in existing data-poisoning defenses.

cs.CR

Foundations and Design Principles of Lightweight Cryptography for IoT Systems

The successful deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT) applications relies heavily on their robust security, and lightweight cryptography is considered an emerging solution in this context. While existing surveys have been examining lightweight cryptographic techniques from the perspective of hardware and software implementations or performance evaluation, there is a significant gap in addressing different security aspects, such as design principles, specific to the IoT environment. This study aims to bridge this gap. This research presents an examination with focusing on the security evaluation of symmetric lightweight ciphers commonly used in IoT systems. The objective of this study is to provide a concise overview of lightweight ciphers with emphasizing on their security challenges which is an essential consideration for real-time and resource-constrained applications.

cs.CR