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arXiv · 2606.06860

On the Incentive Compatibility of Block Propagation in Bitcoin

Abstract

Bitcoin is permissionless and does not rely on any central administrator, which gives it strong censorship resistance. At the same time, it is important to incentivize miners to behave in ways that align with the interests of the system as a whole. This paper asks whether miners are individually incentivized to propagate blocks, one of the most fundamental processes in Bitcoin. Miners collectively maintain the blockchain by generating blocks and disseminating them across the network. If miners have an incentive not to propagate some blocks, this would indicate a fundamental flaw in Bitcoin's incentive design. Although prior work has studied how propagation delays affect forks and mining rewards, it has not fully characterized miners' incentives to improve block propagation under different tie-breaking rules. To address this gap, we derive analytical reward expressions for each tie-breaking rule based on a blockchain network model that captures the effect of forks on mining fairness. These expressions explicitly characterize how block propagation delays, hashrate distribution, and tie-breaking rules jointly determine mining rewards. We then use them to analyze miners' incentives to improve block propagation. Our results show, for example, that miners have no mining-reward incentive to relay blocks generated by other miners. By contrast, under the first-seen rule, every non-majority miner is incentivized to receive other miners' blocks more quickly and to propagate its own blocks more quickly. Finally, we compare tie-breaking rules and identify a trade-off between propagation incentives and mining fairness. In particular, the first-seen rule provides the strongest incentives to reduce propagation delays, but it also worsens mining fairness the most.

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Fumichika Maeda, Akira Sakurai, Taishi Nakai, Kazuyuki Shudo. 2026-06-05. On the Incentive Compatibility of Block Propagation in Bitcoin. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.06860

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