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arXiv · 2606.29954

Fundamental Logic Through the Lens of Modality

Abstract

Fundamental logic is a non-classical logic based only on the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction, disjunction, negation, and the quantifiers in a Fitch-style natural deduction system. In this paper, we attempt to obtain a better understanding of fundamental logic and its semantics through the lens of modality. Using modal logic, we develop means of mutual understanding between the fundamental logician, on the one hand, and the orthologician and intuitionistic logician, on the other: we prove that the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski (GMT) translation of intuitionistic logic into the classical modal logic $\mathsf{S4}$ is a full and faithful embedding of fundamental logic into the orthological version of $\mathsf{S4}$; that the Goldblatt translation of orthologic into the classical modal logic $\mathsf{KTB}$ is a full and faithful embedding of fundamental logic into an intuitionistic version of $\mathsf{KTB}$; and that the GMT translation is a full and faithful embedding of intuitionistic logic into a modal extension of fundamental logic.

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BibTeXRIS

Wesley H. Holliday, Guillaume Massas. 2026-07-23. Fundamental Logic Through the Lens of Modality. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.29954

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