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arXiv · 2607.23705

Social learning drives underprioritization of collective challenges

Abstract

Societies often struggle to prioritize important challenges in a timely manner, with substantial costs from delayed action on issues like climate change and pandemic mitigation. A persistent puzzle is that broad concern on issues often fails to translate into collective priority. We argue that a key driver lies in how concern is formed across competing issue domains. Some issues depend heavily on social learning, where individuals infer importance from others, often because direct experience is limited. Others depend more on individual learning from firsthand experience. We develop a dynamic model in which two subgroups form issue-specific concerns through individual and social learning, and these concerns are aggregated into collective priority. The model yields three insights. First, with two issues of equal objective severity, the one that depends more on social learning tends to be underprioritized when both issues are severe. Second, gradual increases in severity delay reprioritization of the issue, with the delay growing as reliance on social learning increases. Third, this bias can be reduced by reducing social learning or by increasing intergroup learning beyond a critical threshold. These results offer a general mechanism for why severe problems can remain neglected in collective action despite widespread concern, and why intergroup interaction or experiential simulations may help align collective priorities with objective risks.

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Russ Yoon, Vicky Chuqiao Yang. 2026-08-08. Social learning drives underprioritization of collective challenges. https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23705

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