Search arXiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2607.27544

Lucky or Good? Outcome Noise, Effective Sample Size, and the Attribution of Skill

Karl T. Ulrich
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

When do outcome records carry enough signal to support reliable inferences about skill? When they do not, what should evaluators substitute? The framework answering the first question characterizes any decision domain with two parameters: the noise reflected in each outcome and the effective number of independent outcomes that are available over an observation window. When domains are positioned in a two-dimensional space of noise versus number of outcomes, those in which capital, prestige, and political power are routinely allocated on the basis of realized outcomes (e.g., mutual fund management, venture capital, executive performance) fall in the region where outcome records contain too little signal to support reliable individual-level inferences. Evaluating actors when outcome records are insufficient can be done by adopting the populationlevel empirical validation methods long used in medicine: has the actor adopted the practices that, at the population level, are associated with better outcomes?

Explore related subjects

econ.GNq-fin.ECq-fin.GN

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Karl T. Ulrich. 2026-07-30. Lucky or Good? Outcome Noise, Effective Sample Size, and the Attribution of Skill. https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.27544

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

Local Media and the Shaping of Social Norms: Evidence from the Ebola outbreak

Media's influence on norms and behavior is widely recognized. Less is known about the role played by media being local. I examine this in a high-stakes context, the Ebola outbreak in Guinea. I exploit quasi-random variation in access to radio and the timing of a public-health campaign aired on community radio. I find that 12-17% of Ebola cases could have been prevented if places with access to a neighboring community radio station had instead had their own. Impacts are driven by radio being local rather than by ethno-linguistic belonging. Local media facilitates coordination in behaviors observed and sanctioned locally.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2026

Productivity Shocks and Input Misallocation: A Decomposition

This paper asks how much input misallocation productivity uncertainty generates and at which stage of input decisions it arises. I separate revenue productivity by when each component is revealed and trace each into the gap between an input's marginal revenue product and its price. In six European countries, shocks revealed after an input is committed account for 20 percent of capital gap dispersion and 5 percent of labor gap dispersion. An unanticipated one percent rise in productivity raises the capital gap by 0.92 percent and the labor gap by 0.19 percent, because most of the shock passes into the wage.

econ.GN↗
arXiv2026

When Do Type-Specific Wages Buffer Distributional Incidence in TANK?

When do relative wages buffer the unequal incidence of aggregate shocks? I derive a consumption-gap decomposition and a present-value condition for partial offset in a TANK model. An extension separates wage-setting demand elasticity from substitution between labor segments and allows each segment to contain both financial types. With a zero inherited wage gap and a same-sign discounted wedge, substitution above one gives offsetting earnings reallocation; substitution below one gives amplification. The channel disappears when financial types have identical segment exposure. Numerical experiments assess these mechanisms, shock persistence, policy feedback, and aggregate-IRF matching. In the nested perfect-alignment monetary benchmark, the peak consumption gap is about two-fifths smaller under type-specific wages than under the common-wage closure. These are conditional model comparisons, not empirical effect estimates or welfare rankings.

econ.GN↗