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arXiv · 2608.01564

Source-Bounded Exact Recovery over Docker's Logs API

Kelvin Amoaba
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Abstract

Docker can retain records that a collector misses before attachment or during downtime. A persisted read position does not by itself ensure recovery after lifecycle changes. We study what exact recovery contract is achievable through Docker's supported Logs API. We define source-bounded exactness: every retained, distinguishable source record eventually appears exactly once in durable collector output. Our method uses a generation-aware multiset oracle that separates source truncation from collector omission and exposes simultaneous loss and replay. Applied to LogDeck, it uncovered a start-to-attachment race; a one-record attachment overlap, finite Docker-API reconciliation, and exact insertion closed the tested boundary. We compare the fixed revision with unmodified Grafana Alloy 1.18.0, which uses the same API and persists read positions; across 120 collector-runs, LogDeck was exact in 60/60 and Alloy in 20/60. Alloy succeeded at guarded startup and process pause but omitted retained history when recovery required discovering an exited or restarted source. In a causal control, a 5,000-record source exited before collection: stock discovery was exact in 0/20 trials and acquired nothing, while the same reader given the container ID recovered all records exactly in 20/20. This reproduced on OrbStack and independent Ubuntu hosts with Docker 29.4.0 and 24.0.9; both collectors recovered daemon restart, while neither recovered records after source removal. Exactness assumes distinct tuples of physical generation, timestamp, stream, and bytes; 200,000 byte-identical records across two drivers produced no observed collisions. Our results show that lifecycle reacquisition, not a persisted position alone, determines exact recovery within the retained-source horizon. This is a bounded interface claim, not a universal collector ranking or proof of collision freedom.

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Kelvin Amoaba. 2026-08-03. Source-Bounded Exact Recovery over Docker's Logs API. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.01564

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