Mechanizing Typed Regulatory Actions for Security Tokens: Semantics, Falsification, and Bounded EVM Evidence

Abstract

Security-token standards expose privileged controls without identifying the legal effect executed or the evidence and reversal obligations it carries. We formalize in Isabelle/HOL a reference execution semantics for the six ERC-8319 meanings: FREEZE, SEIZE, CONFISCATE, LIQUIDATE, RESTRICT, and RECOVER. It distinguishes applied, rejected, and operational-failure outcomes and mechanizes action-specific reversals, replay and epoch rules, complete frames, case-local terminality, and final receipts; the session builds without unproved placeholders or additional axioms. An indistinguishability theorem shows that bound kernel inputs cannot establish external facts about title, settlement, or entitlement. Constructive witnesses and direct mutations establish reachability and sensitivity for the declared fault set. For a successor ERC-TRUST Solidity/EVM candidate, we report separately scoped Foundry, Certora, Kontrol/KEVM, mutation, deterministic-build, runtime-identity, and independent-reproduction evidence. All twelve named evidence lanes pass with none pending, while the 74-row obligation ledger remains conditional: 70 rows are closed, two runtime-link rows remain successor obligations, and two are inapplicable. The Native runtime is bound separately from an ERC-3643 interoperability reference that explicitly reports Partial and full=false, not Verified Full. These results do not establish complete Isabelle-to-Solidity-to-EVM refinement, compiler correctness, audit completion, production readiness, deployment verification, or external legal truth. They provide a machine-checked domain semantics and an explicit map of proved, bounded, assumed, and open results.