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arXiv · 2609.03133

SecDT: A Profile-Based Security Layer for TRDP Communications

Erlantz Alonso·Igor Lopez·Jasone Astorga
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Abstract

The Train Real-time Data Protocol (TRDP) is widely used on rolling stock but it provides limited native support for cryptographic protection. Furthermore, the multicast traffic profile used in TRDP Process Data to exchange critical information between onboard subsystems makes the introduction of cryptographic protection a challenge. This paper presents a lightweight security layer for secure TRDP communication that implements a number of security profiles built around modern cryptographic algorithms. This additional layer relies on an On-board Key Management System (OKMS) for both security profile negotiation, dynamic key distribution and key lifecycle management. The security profiles allow for cryptographic agility and flexibility, ranging from simple authentication to Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms. The security profile negotiation procedure guarantees all TRDP End Devices (ED) on a common Communication ID (ComID) share the same security profile and can therefore process each other's messages. A prototype implementation based on mbedTLS and Arm Platform Security Architecture (PSA) was developed and evaluated. Experimental results demonstrate manageable overhead, suitable for the real-time and time-sensitive communication found on rolling stock.

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Erlantz Alonso, Igor Lopez, Jasone Astorga. 2026-09-02. SecDT: A Profile-Based Security Layer for TRDP Communications. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03133

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