Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations for Model-Relative Response Latency

Abstract

Can a finite verifier obtain public, model-relative evidence about response latency for sequential computation? Verifiable delay functions (VDFs) make this possible in principle: evaluation requires T sequential steps, whereas verification is efficient in the security parameter and polylogarithmic in the numerical value of T for standard constructions. Thus a delay can be astronomically large to evaluate yet succinctly represented and feasibly checked. A VDF proof for a chosen message alone is insufficient because it may be precomputed. We specify and analyze Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations (FCLA), a protocol composition that binds a VDF to an unpredictable public challenge, a message, and independently auditable release and receipt records. Under explicit assumptions about VDF sequentiality, the challenge source, witness logs, and a calibrated upper bound on an adversary's sequential evaluation rate, an accepted FCLA transcript is inconsistent with post-challenge generation by an adversary in that bounded model. The result neither identifies a named claimant nor excludes relaying, outsourcing, or a faster unmodeled machine. A benchmark of the public reference implementation confirms the expected empirical separation between evaluation and verification on one documented machine. Our contribution is a protocol/design analysis and benchmarked reference implementation layer, not a new VDF construction or cryptographic primitive.