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arXiv · 2609.18701

Comparison of Deterministic Information Providers

David Lagziel·Ehud Lehrer·Tao Wang
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Abstract

We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Characterizations are provided for deterministic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, a constructive partition criterion, and common knowledge components. This study elaborates on the work of Blackwell (1951) in games with incomplete information, using the common knowledge components of Aumann (1976).

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David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang. 2026-09-16. Comparison of Deterministic Information Providers. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18701

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