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arXiv · 2609.34080

LoRo-Mark:Provably Lossless and Robust Agent Watermarking

Abstract

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed as commercial services, protecting proprietary orchestration logic and tool-use policies is important. We consider agent repackaging: an adversary integrates a protected agent into its own application via API and presents it under its own identity. It may modify parts of execution to obscure the source. The owner typically has only black-box access to the repackaged service, so black-box ownership verification is essential. Agent watermarking embeds ownership evidence into agent behavior for later verification. An effective watermark should satisfy two requirements: losslessness, preserving original functionality, and robustness, keeping ownership evidence recoverable after partial modification of execution. Existing methods often embed signals into behavior selection or execution trajectories, intervene in normal decisions, and offer limited robustness to behavior modification. We propose LoRo-Mark, a provably lossless and robust agent watermarking mechanism. For losslessness, it isolates watermarking into a cryptographically authenticated forensic branch that remains inactive during normal execution and is activated only by owner-authorized requests. By reducing unauthorized branch activation to standard MAC security, LoRo-Mark formally guarantees performance preservation. For robustness, it redundantly distributes ownership information across forensic behavior sequences, enabling reliable recovery under partial behavior substitution and sequence truncation. Experiments across multiple LLM agents show zero degradation on normal tasks and reliable ownership verification under sequence modifications.

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BibTeXRIS

Haoyang Zou, Yao Wang, Jun Yao, Weiming Zhang, Han Fang. 2026-09-28. LoRo-Mark:Provably Lossless and Robust Agent Watermarking. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.34080

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