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arXiv · 2610.01897

Shared Models, Selective Trading, and Order Flow

Victoria Ruojie Li·Arka Prava Bandyopadhyay
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Abstract

We study whether model diversity survives selection into trading. In synthetic markets with a fixed mixture of three language-model families, news presentation changes their representation among submitted orders. At the announcement round, Qwen's share of submitted orders shifts by 48 percentage points in the financing event, with little change in net order counts. In the workforce-reduction event, Mistral's share shifts by 40 percentage points while net counts reverse sign. Homogeneous populations remove opposing flow when their active decisions share a direction. An analytical decomposition shows why selection can improve or worsen price accuracy even at unchanged aggregate demand sensitivity. The evidence concerns presentation bundles and submitted flow; cleaner replication and a known-value validation are specified prospectively.

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Victoria Ruojie Li, Arka Prava Bandyopadhyay. 2026-10-01. Shared Models, Selective Trading, and Order Flow. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01897

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