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arXiv · 2610.02834

Axient: Canonical Protocol-Graph Composition for Leveraged Event Markets: Single State Authority, Atomic Composition, Durable Sagas, and Exactly-Once Recovery

Maksym Nechepurenko
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Abstract

A modular leveraged event-market protocol can contain individually correct contracts for risk approval, positions, debt, settlement evidence, credit pools, junior backstops, reserves, liquidation, and governance while still lacking one authoritative financial execution path. This paper develops a canonical protocol graph in which every financial domain has one storage authority and composition components coordinate transitions without recreating balances, debt, positions, evidence receipts, queues, reserves, pause state, or terminal scenario state. The architecture formalizes atomic position origination, a settlement-confirmed debt saga, trader residual release, an ordered reserve-backstop-Senior loss waterfall, loss-participating withdrawal queues, capability-conditioned execution, protocol-wide pause and timelocked recovery, deterministic deployment manifests, canonical state projection, and exactly-once reconstruction after a chain-confirmed checkpoint. We prove composition-level authority uniqueness, atomic closure, loss conservation and priority, receipt-idempotent settlement, legal no-go safety, capability-transition safety, and no-financial-reexecution recovery under explicit assumptions. The implementation is evaluated through twelve parent Financial Interaction Assertions (FIA-001-FIA-012), including mandatory FIA-011A/B capability subcases. The registered local cohort contains twelve uniquely correlated scenario records and 84 retained ACTUAL_EVIDENCE layer positions, two clean materializations with one byte-identical file index, a deterministic strict archive accepted by a separate verifier, and a selected ordered replay bound to that archive. The result connects the formal protocol graph to a reproducible evidence chain while preserving explicit boundaries between the observed engineering result and future external-operation hypotheses.

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Maksym Nechepurenko. 2026-10-02. Axient: Canonical Protocol-Graph Composition for Leveraged Event Markets: Single State Authority, Atomic Composition, Durable Sagas, and Exactly-Once Recovery. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7547363

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