Signaling via Money

Olivier Bos; Martin Pollrich

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arXiv · 2610.03146

Signaling via Money

Olivier Bos·Martin Pollrich

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Abstract

We study mechanisms in which agents' preferences depend both on an object allocation and on a third party's beliefs about private information. A mechanism determines an allocation, transfers, and sends signals to the aftermarket. We compare two informational environments: (i) private transfers, where the aftermarket observes allocations and signals, and (ii) public transfers, where transfers are publicly observable. Our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome implementable with hidden transfers can be approximated arbitrarily well with public transfers. Thus, transfer observability generates at most a vanishing informational distortion and helps rationalize the common assumption that transfers remain hidden from aftermarkets.

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Olivier Bos, Martin Pollrich. 2026-10-02. Signaling via Money. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03146

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