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arXiv · 2610.03250

No Women No Innovation? The Effect of Women on Boards on Hard and Soft Innovation in SMEs

Francesca Pascale·Saverio Barabuffi·Giulio Ferrigno
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Abstract

The role of women on corporate boards and its impact on innovation remains heavily debated. While existing literature offers conflicting perspectives on whether female board representation spurs or hinders innovaiton, most research has focused exlusively on large firms. This studt adresses this gap by investigating the causal impact of women on boards on both "hard" (technological) and "soft" (non-technological) innovation within SMEs. Using a longitudinal dataset f 2762 Italian innovative SMEs from 2015 to 2024 and a 2SLS identification strategy, we find highly nuanced patterns. For hard innovation, the instrumented model reveals a robust positive causal impacr, reversing a negative baseline coefficient and exposing a severe negative selection bias. For soft innovation, a stable positive impact is confirmed. Our findings provide crucial causal evidence for SMEs' governance, while offering tailored insights for policymakers and practitioners to incentivize women' management roles in SMES.

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Francesca Pascale, Saverio Barabuffi, Giulio Ferrigno. 2026-10-02. No Women No Innovation? The Effect of Women on Boards on Hard and Soft Innovation in SMEs. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03250

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