Learning in Inverse Games: Tractable Training with Probabilistic Guarantees

Abstract

Inverse game theory seeks to learn agents' unknown objectives from observed equilibrium behavior. Existing residual-based approaches can lead to non-convex problems and need not ensure strong monotonicity of the learned game, limiting reliable equilibrium prediction. We develop a tractable convex framework for learning static and dynamic non-cooperative games using first-order and Nikaido-Isoda (NI) loss. Specialized operator parameterizations, including a Helmholtz--Hodge decomposition in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS), enforce strong monotonicity for quadratic, nonparametric, non-quadratic, and linear-quadratic dynamic games. We establish finite-sample out-of-sample prediction guarantees, using Rademacher complexity to match existing bounds for the non-quadratic setting. For noisy sequential data, we develop a robust receding-horizon learning scheme whose adaptive regularization admits a maximum a posteriori (MAP) interpretation and is computed using randomized trace estimation. Numerical experiments, including a stylized autonomous-vehicle collision-avoidance application, demonstrate predictive accuracy and robustness to measurement noise.