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arXiv · 2610.07870

Plug-and-Play Quantum-Resistant BLE Pairing for Medical Implants via NFC Out-of-Band

Muhammad Asim Javaid·Muhammad Shafay Tanveer Hassan·Faaiz Umer·Sotirios Panagiotou·Christos Strydis·Naveed Anwar Bhatti·Muhammad Adeel Pasha·Muhammad Ali Siddiqi
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Abstract

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) pairing establishes the cryptographic foundation for secure device communication. However, mainstream man-in-the-middle (MITM)-resistant pairing methods, such as Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry, require user interfaces that implantable medical devices (IMDs) inherently lack, making Near-Field Communication (NFC)-assisted Out-of-Band (OOB) pairing an attractive alternative. Existing NFC-assisted OOB schemes authenticate a classical BLE key exchange that remains vulnerable to quantum attacks, while the NFC channel itself is susceptible to eavesdropping and active injection under stronger threat models. To address these limitations, we propose a lightweight, plug-and-play NFC-based OOB pairing protocol that performs a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) entirely over the NFC channel, ensuring that no shared secret is transmitted over NFC while reducing long-range radio-frequency (RF) exposure during pairing. The proposed protocol requires no modifications to the BLE stack and inherently resists RF battery-depletion attacks. Evaluation on an IMD-class proof-of-concept testbed demonstrates that post-quantum OOB pairing is practical on resource-constrained devices, reducing projected battery life by less than 0.57\% for Kyber-1024 and 0.56\% for FireSABER under an operational usage model relative to the MITM-vulnerable Just Works method.

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Muhammad Asim Javaid, Muhammad Shafay Tanveer Hassan, Faaiz Umer, Sotirios Panagiotou, Christos Strydis, Naveed Anwar Bhatti, Muhammad Adeel Pasha, Muhammad Ali Siddiqi. 2026-10-06. Plug-and-Play Quantum-Resistant BLE Pairing for Medical Implants via NFC Out-of-Band. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07870

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