Search arXiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2610.10316

Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots

Federico Fioravanti·Zoi Terzopoulou
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant voting rule is robust to this dependence. We show that ranked ballots change the picture sharply: a rank-based rule is robust to the presentation order if and only if it is tops-only. Robustness to anchoring is thus available, but only at the price of ignoring everything a voter reports beyond her favourite alternative.

Explore related subjects

econ.TH

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Federico Fioravanti, Zoi Terzopoulou. 2026-10-07. Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10316

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

Existence of Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games without Common Priors

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolute continuity of information in Milgrom and Weber (1985), and prove that Bayesian equilibria exist in a broad class of games, including those with discontinuous payoffs. Examples illustrate the scope and implications of our findings.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2026

Bundling Complements

I study a monopolist selling goods to a buyer with combinatorial preferences. The seller's dual is a minimum-cost flow of the differential virtual value. I characterize two reductions: when the differential virtual value is represented on types, and when this representation is independent of the preference. The distribution then determines the \emph{required directions}, along which the dual transports mass, and the preference the \emph{covered directions} of each bundle; optimality is full coverage. Comparative statics in the preference use this separation: a premium on bundles containing a core of goods models complementarity and widens their covered directions. Two thresholds describe the optimum: above a lower threshold the grand bundle must be offered; above an upper threshold a \emph{core-peripheral} menu --- a bundled core with optional add-ons not sold standalone --- is optimal. The upper threshold is finite if and only if the menu is \emph{inclusive}: it excludes no near-top buyer.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2026

Breaking the Chain: Division Norms and Criminal Deterrence

We study how internal division norms affect the cost of deterring a criminal organization, holding every coalition's proceeds fixed. The authority assigns deterrence capacity to named members after these norms are fixed but before coalitions form. Under population-monotone division, where no incumbent loses rent as a coalition expands, the minimum budget required to block every coalition equals the cost of the cheapest removal order. Targeting a high-rent hub first can reduce total costs because its removal lowers the rents of the remaining members. Our main result identifies the most resistant division norm: when the Shapley value applied to every coalition is population monotone, it uniquely maximizes the required budget within this class by making all removal orders equally costly. For a fixed norm in this class, allowing some proceeds to be reallocated after capacities are observed weakly increases the budget, reaching the full organization's proceeds under full transferability. Exact Shapley optimality can fail at arbitrarily small positive liquidity.

econ.TH↗