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arXiv · 2610.12952

WaveMark: Robust Wavelet-Domain Image Watermarking for Diffusion Models

Jie Cao·Qi Li·Chaklam Cheong·Yutong Jin·Enze Yu·Zelin Zhang·Jianbing Ni
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Abstract

Image watermarking enables provenance tracing for photorealistic images generated by diffusion models. However, state-of-the-art (SOTA) removal attacks can suppress embedded signals with little perceptual degradation. This vulnerability limits the effectiveness of watermarks for intellectual property protection and misuse attribution. We propose WaveMark, a novel wavelet-domain watermarking method that embeds messages in a diffusion model's initial noise. To support robust recovery from perturbed carriers, WaveMark distributes keyed replicas of message bits across spatial positions, wavelet orientations, and scales. Each carrier groups coefficients from four latent channels and encodes a randomized bit through magnitude projection, providing an explicit decoding margin. We evaluate WaveMark with SD2.1 on SDP and MS-COCO Captions under 14 attacks. WaveMark achieves 100.0% bit accuracy (BA) without attacks, while maintaining image quality comparable to the evaluated baselines. Under SOTA MarkNull and MarkNull-A, it retains over 88% BA, outperforming all baselines.

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Jie Cao, Qi Li, Chaklam Cheong, Yutong Jin, Enze Yu, Zelin Zhang, Jianbing Ni. 2026-10-09. WaveMark: Robust Wavelet-Domain Image Watermarking for Diffusion Models. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12952

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