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arXiv · 2610.14404

DICE: Tilting the Odds through Interface Attacks on System One Model

Abstract

System One models offer typed judgments that applications can turn into decisions. Their answers, however, are conditional on the state and question supplied by surrounding components, and on how the application uses the response. We study this boundary in a Jev-based pipeline with bounded substitutions at three adapter outputs: state extraction, question generation, and output interpretation. Across three small synthetic studies, each adapter can change the final decision while Jev and its authentic API responses remain outside attacker control. The cases expose distinct failures of source fidelity, answer meaning, and response relevance. Checks that bind these relationships stopped the corresponding interventions we tested, although source verification also rejected some valid clean decisions. The pilot identifies where correct request-level judgments can lose their connection to the original task; it does not estimate the prevalence of these failures in deployed systems.

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Ben Dong, Tianyi Lu, Zhonghao Guo, Qian Wang. 2026-10-19. DICE: Tilting the Odds through Interface Attacks on System One Model. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.14404

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