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arXiv · 2610.15541

Fetch Me If You Can: A Comprehensive Analysis of Fetch Metadata

Pedro Bernardo·Alex Ploner·Marco Squarcina·Mauro Tempesta·Matteo Maffei
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Abstract

Effective server-side defenses against cross-site attacks depend on understanding the context in which browser requests are generated. However, servers often lack the information needed to distinguish legitimate requests from potentially malicious cross-site interactions. Fetch Metadata, a security mechanism introduced in 2019, addresses this limitation by adding a set of HTTP headers to outgoing browser requests. These headers provide servers with information about a request's context and provenance, enabling them to enforce request isolation policies accordingly. However, the extent of Fetch Metadata's real-world adoption and its interaction with existing security mechanisms remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study of Fetch Metadata adoption. We analyze the top 1M websites in the Tranco list to detect deployments of Fetch Metadata isolation policies and identify custom policies used in the wild. We then examine how these policies address cross-site threats and assess their security coverage. Finally, we provide the first systematic comparison of Fetch Metadata with existing client-side security mechanisms, revealing security gaps that arise from differences between client-side and server-side enforcement.

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Pedro Bernardo, Alex Ploner, Marco Squarcina, Mauro Tempesta, Matteo Maffei. 2026-10-11. Fetch Me If You Can: A Comprehensive Analysis of Fetch Metadata. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15541

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