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arXiv · 2610.15988

CreepScope: Measuring Post-Use Authorization Exposure in Tool-Using Agents

Haoran Yu·Lifei Liu·Danping Zhang·Su Wang·Pin Qian·Yihang Chen·Xiaochong Jiang
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Abstract

Authorization checks at individual tool calls do not reveal how long earlier authority remains usable. We study this lifecycle failure as privilege creep: a capability stays reachable after its last justified workflow step. We present CreepScope, a trace-oriented evaluation protocol that samples reachable authority at every step and separates no-remaining-use exposure into stale-after-use and never-required components; Capability-Step Exposure (CSE) counts total stepwise overexposure and Residual Privilege Debt (RPD) the terminal residue, while stale-after-use exposure is the direct privilege-creep measure. A 96-cell deterministic replay over 12 controlled storage, communication, and cloud-operation workflows validates these semantics: Static Task Scope and Monotonic On-Demand retain mean CSEs of 26 and 13, whereas an oracle-controlled Step Lease has zero CSE and zero residual debt by construction. All three persistent regimes share the same stale-after-use exposure of 13, so their CSE differences come from scope and grant timing rather than post-use retention; Full Access alone adds 91.33 never-required capability-steps. A separate 24-episode local case then lets Qwen2 7B choose tools in one simulated mail workflow: the injected stale send executes in all nine persistent-policy episodes and in none of the three Step-Lease episodes, while all 24 required action sequences complete. These results establish a reproducible containment case, not cross-workflow or cross-model effectiveness. Core metrics are reconstructed from raw events, and exact gates reject incomplete or duplicated evaluation grids.

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Haoran Yu, Lifei Liu, Danping Zhang, Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Xiaochong Jiang. 2026-10-11. CreepScope: Measuring Post-Use Authorization Exposure in Tool-Using Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.15988

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