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arXiv · 2610.16373

Resource-constrained Remote Attestation of Smart Meters Using Merkle Trees in a Trusted Execution Environment

Abstract

Smart meters are pivotal to the functioning of smart grids, as they measure and transmit energy consumption data that includes sensitive information about household energy usage patterns. While this data offers significant financial benefits, it can also reveal detailed insights into residents' daily routines, making the security of smart meters a critical concern. This paper introduces a novel remote attestation method for smart meters that ensures the integrity and privacy of data exchanged between smart meters and central servers while detecting unauthorized tampering. Our approach structures the communication data into a Merkle Tree-a hash data structure that facilitates efficient data integrity and authenticity verification. All operations involved in constructing the Merkle root and hashing critical data are executed in the secure environment of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) using OP-TEE, thereby maintaining the integrity and security of the smart meter's data. Comparing our experimental results with the related works highlights the superiority of our method in terms of resource efficiency, security robustness, and the feasibility of implementation on smart meters and resource-constrained devices, thereby enhancing the overall security and reliability of smart grid systems.

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BibTeXRIS

Amirhossein Shakiba, Hamid Reza Ghaeini, Sadegh Dorri Nogoorani. 2026-10-12. Resource-constrained Remote Attestation of Smart Meters Using Merkle Trees in a Trusted Execution Environment. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.16373

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