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arXiv · 2610.17249

Tight End-to-End Accounting for Differentially Private Synthetic Data

Abstract

Differentially private (DP) pipelines often combine heterogeneous mechanisms, yet their guarantees are best analyzed using different notions of privacy (e.g., bounded range, zCDP, ADP). When composing them, we have to analyze the guarantees through a reduced common representation that loses accounting precision. This issue is particularly relevant in DP synthetic data generation, where data preprocessing, generation algorithms, and DP-SGD could appear within the same pipeline. We develop novel tools for tight end-to-end accounting of such compositions using privacy loss distributions (PLD), $f$-DP, and Gaussian DP (GDP). In particular, we derive PLD and GDP analyses of bounded-range mechanisms such as the Exponential mechanism. Building on these theoretical results, we introduce AIM-GDP, a GDP-native variant of AIM (a state-of-the-art DP synthetic data mechanism) that enables easy composability with complex pipelines via PLD, attack-aware risk calibration, and tight end-to-end auditing while consistently achieving better utility; and MixCal, an algorithm for calibrating adaptive mixed compositions using PLD accounting. Overall, our tools enable tighter end-to-end accounting and thus less noise at the same privacy level in DP synthetic data pipelines.

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BibTeXRIS

Georgi Ganev, Vadym Doroshenko, Arun Ganesh, Juan Felipe Gomez, Ryan McKenna, Bogdan Kulynych. 2026-10-12. Tight End-to-End Accounting for Differentially Private Synthetic Data. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.17249

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