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arXiv · 2610.20047

ESAU: Expeditious Swarm Remote Attestation for Pub-Sub IoT Networks with Untrusted Cloud-based Proxy Verifier

Abstract

As Internet of Things (IoT) devices collect and process data, security is essential. IoT devices often combine with other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and fifth-generation (5G) communications, to support applications such as smart grids and internet-of-vehicles (IoV). Because IoT devices are deployed remotely, remote attestation (RA) effectively verifies each device's state. However, the scale of IoT deployments makes device management challenging for owners. Therefore, cloud-assisted IoT management services often provide RA solutions. Although cloud-based IoT services can securely manage IoT devices, passive malicious administrators or hacked IoT device owners' accounts can control IoT devices without cloud IoT service authorization. Therefore, this work proposes a cloud-assisted RA system that addresses three main challenges of IoT device RA: 1) lightweight RA design for resource-limited IoT devices, 2) unauthorized access to IoT devices by passive malicious administrators or compromised owner accounts on the cloud IoT management platform, and 3) RA may not extend to an authenticated key exchange protocol. In addition to proposing a swarm RA scheme that addresses these three challenges, this work analyzes the system's security properties and evaluates its feasibility through implementation and simulation.

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Ruei-Hau Hsu, Yu-Hsiang Hu, Rafael Kaliski, Tse-Yuan Yu. 2026-10-14. ESAU: Expeditious Swarm Remote Attestation for Pub-Sub IoT Networks with Untrusted Cloud-based Proxy Verifier. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20047

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